FIPS 140-3
FIPS mode in Keyreeve is not a setting. Every binary runs inside Go's FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic module and refuses to start outside it — the server, the host agent, the cluster agent, the CLI and the desktop application.
What that means in practice
| Where | Algorithm |
|---|---|
| SSH user and host certificate authorities | ECDSA P-384 |
| People's SSH keys | ECDSA P-256 |
| Local passwords | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-512 |
| Agent service certificates and agent keys | ECDSA P-384 machine CA, ECDSA P-256 agent keys |
| Recordings and stored secrets | AES-256-GCM, a key per recording |
| Recordings waiting on a host | Encrypted for the servers with ECDH P-384, HKDF-SHA-256 and AES-256-GCM |
| Recording search index | HMAC-SHA-256 (a blind index) |
| Desktop app vault | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-512 and AES-256-GCM |
| Agent, CLI and desktop transport | TLS 1.2+ with a single FIPS profile (ECDHE P-256/P-384, AES-GCM), mutual TLS for agents |
Ed25519 is not used for any Keyreeve key material.
It cannot be turned off
The fips140=on directive only sets a default, which a host-wide GODEBUG could otherwise override. Each Keyreeve binary therefore checks the mode at startup and, if it finds the setting turned off, strips it out of GODEBUG, says so on stderr and restarts itself.
That matters for an agent: a stray environment setting on one host must not be able to quietly downgrade it, and must not be able to lock everyone out of that host's sshd either.
The module is the Go Cryptographic Module v1.0.0, validated under FIPS 140-3 (CMVP certificate #5247). The server logs its FIPS mode when it starts.

